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Abstract
In this paper we study several monotonicity axioms in approval-based
multi-winner voting rules. We consider monotonicity with respect to the
support received by the winners and also monotonicity in the size of the
committee. Monotonicity with respect to the support is studied when
the set of voters does not change and when new voters enter the election.
For each of these two cases we consider a strong and a weak version of
the axiom. We observe certain incompatibilities between the monotonic-
ity axioms and well-known representation axioms (extended/proportional
justified representation) for the voting rules that we analyze, and provide
formal proofs of incompatibility between some monotonicity axioms and
perfect representation.
1 Introduction
There are many situations in which it is necessary to aggregate the preferences
of a group of agents to select a finite set of alternatives. Typical examples
are the election of representatives in indirect democracy, shortlisting candidates
for a position (Elkind, Faliszewski, Skowron, and Slinko, 2017; Barbera´ and
Coelho, 2008), selection by a company of the group of products that it is going
to offer to its customers (Lu and Boutilier, 2011), selection of the web pages
that should be shown to a user in response to a given query (Dwork, Kumar,
Naor, and Sivakumar, 2001; Skowron, Lackner, Brill, Peters, and Elkind, 2017),
peer grading in Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) (Caragiannis, 2017) or
recommender systems (Elkind et al., 2017; Naamani-Dery, Kalech, Rokach, and
Shapira, 2014). The typical mechanism for such preference aggregations is the
use of multi-winner voting rules.
The use of axioms for analyzing voting rules is well established in social
choice and dates back to the work of Arrow (Arrow, 1951). However, multi-
winner voting rules have not been studied much so far from an axiomatic per-
spective. In particular, we can cite the work of Dummet (Dummet, 1984),
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Elkind et al. (Elkind et al., 2017), Faliszewski, Skowron, Slinko, and Talmon (Faliszewski
et al., 2019), and Woodall (Woodall, 1994) for multi-winner elections that use
ranked ballots. For approval-based multi-winner elections the concept of repre-
sentation has been recently axiomatized by Aziz, Brill, Conitzer, Elkind, Free-
man, and Walsh (Aziz et al., 2017), who proposed two axioms called justified
representation and extended justified representation, and Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez,
Elkind, Lackner, Ferna´ndez, Fisteus, Basanta Val, and Skowron (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez
et al., 2017), who proposed a weakening of extended justified representation that
they called proportional justified representation.
In this paper we complement these previous works with the study of mono-
tonicity axioms for approval-based multi-winner voting rules. First of all, we
consider monotonicity in the support received by the winners. Informally, the
idea of monotonicity in the support is that if a subset of the winners in an
election sees their support increased and the support of all the other candidates
remains the same, then it seems reasonable that such candidates should remain
in the set of winners. Monotonicity with respect to the support is studied when
the set of voters does not change and when new voters enter the election. Our
first contribution is to propose an axiom for each of these two cases and, for each
of these two axioms, to define a strong and a weak version of the axiom. We
also consider monotonicity in the size of the committee, although in this case
we will reuse an axiom that has already been proposed by Elkind et al. (Elkind
et al., 2017).
Following the work of Elkind et al. (Elkind et al., 2017) and Faliszewski,
Skowron, Slinko, and Talmon (Faliszewski et al., 2017) we will discuss the rele-
vance of these axioms in three different types of scenarios:
• Excellence. The goal is to select the best k candidates for a given pur-
pose. It is supposed that in a second step (out of the scope of the multi-
winner election) one of the selected candidates is finally selected. Exam-
ples of this type of elections are choosing the finalists of a competition or
shortlisting of candidates for a position.
• Diversity. In this case the goal is that as many voters as possible have one
of their preferred candidates in the committee. Several examples of this
type are discussed by Elkind et al. (Elkind et al., 2017) and Faliszewski
et al. (Faliszewski et al., 2017). One such example is to select the set of
movies that are going to be offered to the passengers during an air flight
(the airline company is interested in that all passengers find something
that they like).
• Proportional representation. In this case the goal is to select a com-
mittee that represents as precisely as possible the opinions of the society.
The typical example of this scenario are parliamentary elections.
Then, we analyze several well-known voting rules with these axioms. We ob-
serve certain incompatibilities between the monotonicity axioms and extended/proportional
justified representation for the voting rules that we analyze and provide formal
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proofs of incompatibility between some of these axioms and perfect representa-
tion (another axiom proposed by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez
et al., 2017)). At the end of this paper we review briefly some previous works
that study monotonicity axioms in approval-based multi-winner elections, draw
some conclusions and outline some lines of continuation of this work.
2 Preliminaries
We consider elections in which a fixed number k of candidates or alternatives
must be chosen from a set of candidates C. We assume that |C| ≥ k ≥ 1.
The set of voters is represented as N = {1, . . . , n}. Each voter i that par-
ticipates in the election casts a ballot Ai that consists of the subset of the
candidates that the voter approves of (that is, Ai ⊆ C). We refer to the
ballots cast by the voters that participate in the election as the ballot pro-
file A = (A1, . . . , An). An approval-based multi-winner election E is therefore
represented by E = (N,C,A, k). The set of voters N and the set of candidates
C will be omitted when they are clear from the context.
Given a voting rule R, for each election E = (A, k), we say that R(E) is the
output of the voting rule R for such election. Ties may happen in the voting
rules that we are going to consider. To take this into account, given an election
E and a voting rule R we say that the value of R(E) is the set of size at least
one composed of all the possible sets of winners outputted by rule R for election
E . We say that a candidates subset W of size k is a set of winners for election
E and rule R if W belongs to R(E). We stress that our results are to a large
extent independent of how ties are broken.
Given an election E = (N,C,A, k) and a non-empty candidates subset G
of C, we define E∆G, as the election obtained by adding to election E one
voter that approves of only the candidates in G. That is, E∆G = (N∆G =
{1, . . . , n, n+ 1}, C,A∆G = (A1, . . . , An, G), k). Given a non-empty candidates
subset G and a voter i ∈ N such that she does not approve of any of the
candidates in G we define Ei+G, as the election obtained if voter i decides to
approve of all the candidates in G in addition to the candidates in Ai. That is,
Ei+G = (N,C,Ai+G = (A1, . . . , Ai−1, Ai ∪G,Ai+1, . . . , An), k).
We recall now the notions of justified representation and extended justified
representation due to Aziz et al. (Aziz et al., 2017), and of proportional justified
representation due to Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017).
Definition 1. Consider an election E = (N,C,A, k). Given a positive integer
ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we say that a set of voters N∗ ⊆ N is ℓ-cohesive if |N∗| ≥ ℓn
k
and |
⋂
i∈N∗ Ai| ≥ ℓ. We say that a set of candidates W , |W | = k, provides
justified representation (JR) for E if for every 1-cohesive set of voters N∗ ⊆ N
it holds that there exists a voter i in N∗ such that Ai ∩W 6= ∅. We say that
a set of candidates W , |W | = k, provides extended justified representation
(EJR) (respectively, proportional justified representation (PJR)) for E if for
every ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k} and every ℓ-cohesive set of voters N∗ ⊆ N it holds that there
exists a voter i in N∗ such that |Ai∩W | ≥ ℓ (respectively, |W∩(
⋃
i∈N∗ Ai)| ≥ ℓ).
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We say that an approval-based voting rule satisfies justified representation (JR),
extended justified representation (EJR), or proportional justified representation
(PJR) if for every election E = (N,C,A, k) it outputs a committee that provides
JR, EJR, or PJR, respectively, for E.
Aziz et al. (Aziz et al., 2017), and Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez
et al., 2017) prove that EJR implies PJR and that PJR implies JR, both for
rules and for committees.
Below we introduce the voting rules that we are going to consider in this
study. First of all, we present the following voting rules, surveyed by Kilgour (Kilgour,
2010).
Approval Voting (AV). Under AV, the winners are the k candidates that
receive the largest number of votes. Formally, for each approval-based multi-
winner election (A, k), the approval score of a candidate c is |{i : c ∈ Ai}|. The
k candidates with the highest approval scores are chosen.
Satisfaction Approval Voting (SAV). A voter’s satisfaction score is the
fraction of her approved candidates that are elected. SAV maximizes the sum of
the voters’ satisfaction scores. Formally, for each approval-based multi-winner
election E = (A, k):
SAV(E) = argmax
W⊆C:|W |=k
∑
i∈N
|Ai ∩W |
|Ai|
. (1)
Minimax Approval Voting (MAV). MAV selects the set of candidates
W that minimizes the maximum Hamming distance (Hamming, 1950) between
W and the voters’ ballots. Let d(A,B) = |A \ B| + |B \ A|, for each pair
of candidates subsets A and B. Then, for each approval-based multi-winner
election E = (A, k):
MAV(E) = argmin
W⊆C:|W |=k
(
max
i∈N
d(W,Ai)
)
. (2)
Since we are interested in the compatibility between representation axioms
and monotonicity axioms we are also going to study several rules that satisfy
some of the above mentioned representation axioms.
Chamberlin and Courant rule and Monroe rule. The voting rules
proposed by Chamberlin and Courant (Chamberlin and Courant, 1983) and
Monroe (Monroe, 1995) select sets of winners that minimize the misrepresenta-
tion of the voters (the number of voters represented by a candidate that they
do not approve of). The difference between the rule of Chamberlin and Courant
(CC) and the rule of Monroe is that in CC each candidate may represent an
arbitrary number of voters while in the Monroe rule each candidate must repre-
sent at least ⌊n
k
⌋ and at most ⌈n
k
⌉ voters. For each approval-based multi-winner
election E = (A, k):
CC(E) = argmin
W⊆C:|W |=k
|{i : Ai ∩W = ∅}|. (3)
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Given an election E = (A, k) and a candidates subset W of size k let MN,W
be the set of all mappings π : N → W such that for each candidate c in W it
holds that ⌊n
k
⌋ ≤ |{i : π(i) = c}| ≤ ⌈n
k
⌉. Then,
Monroe(E) = argmin
W⊆C:|W |=k
min
pi∈MN,W
|{i : π(i) /∈ Ai}|. (4)
Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) and Sequential Proportional
Approval Voting (SeqPAV) were proposed by the Danish mathematician
Thiele (Thiele, 1895) in the late 19th century. Given an election E = (A, k) and
a candidates subsetW of size k, the PAV-score of a voter i is 0 if such voter does
not approve of any of the candidates in W and
∑|Ai∩W |
j=1
1
j
if the voter approves
of some of the candidates in W . PAV selects the sets of winners that maximize
the sum of the PAV-scores of the voters.
PAV(E) = argmax
W⊆C:|W |=k
∑
i:Ai∩W 6=∅
|Ai∩W |∑
j=1
1
j
. (5)
Under the SeqPAV, the set of winners is computed with an iterative algo-
rithm in which at each iteration the candidate with highest SeqPAV score is
added to the set of winners. The SeqPAV score of a candidate c at iteration j
is computed as follows:
SeqPAV(c) =
∑
i:c∈Ai
1
1 + |Ai ∩Wj−1|
. (6)
Here Wj−1 is the set of the first j − 1 candidates added by SeqPAV to the
set of winners.
Phragme´n rules Phragme´n rules were proposed by the Swedish mathe-
matician Phragme´n (Phragme´n, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1899) in the late 19th century.
We refer to the survey by Janson (Janson, 2016) for an extensive discussion of
Phragme´n rules.
Phragme´n voting rules are based on the concept of load. Each candidate in
the set of winners incurs in one unit of load, that should be distributed among
the voters that approve of such candidate. The goal is to choose the set of
winners such that the total load is distributed as evenly as possible between the
voters.
Formally, given an election E = (A, k) and a candidates subset W ⊆ C,
|W | = k, a load distribution is a two dimensional array x = (xi,c)i∈N,c∈W , that
satisfies the following three conditions:
0 ≤ xi,c ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N and c ∈W, (7)
xi,c = 0 if c /∈ Ai, and (8)∑
i∈N
xi,c = 1 for all c ∈W. (9)
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Given a load distribution x, the load of each voter i is defined as xi =∑
c∈W xi,c. Then, given an election E , the rule max-Phragme´n outputs the set
of winners W that minimizes the maximum voter load.
Under seq-Phragme´n the load of each voter changes (increases) at each it-
eration as candidates are added to the set of winners. For j = 0, . . . , k, let x
(j)
i
be the load of voter i after j iterations of seq-Phragme´n. The initial load x
(0)
i
of each voter i is set to 0.
At each iteration j + 1 the load s
(j+1)
c associated to each candidate c is
computed as:
s(j+1)c =
1 +
∑
i:c∈Ai
x
(j)
i
|{i : c ∈ Ai}|
. (10)
The underlying idea of this expression is to distribute equally between all
the voters that approve of candidate c the unit of load corresponding to such
candidate plus the load that each of such voters had after the first j iterations.
Then, at each iteration the candidate w with the lowest load is added to the set
of winners and the loads of the voters are updated as follows: for each voter i
that approves of candidate w, we have x
(j+1)
i = s
(j+1)
w , while the load of each
voter h that does not approve of candidate w does not change: x
(j+1)
h = x
(j)
h .
3 Support monotonicity
Some previous work (see Section 6) make use of the following idea of support
monotonicity: if a candidate that was already in the set of winners is added to
the ballot of some voter (without changing anything else in the election), then
such candidate must still belong to the set of winners. We will refer to this
axiom as candidate monotonicity.
Definition 2. We say that a rule R satisfies candidate monotonicity if for each
election E = (N,C,A, k), for each candidate c ∈ C, and for each voter i that
does not approve of c, the following conditions hold: (i) if c belongs to some
winning committee in R(E), then c must also belong to some winning committee
in R(Ei+{c}); and (ii) if c belongs to all winning committees in R(E), then c
must also belong to all winning committees in R(Ei+{c}).
Candidate monotonicity can be seen as the equivalent of the axiom with the
same name proposed by Elkind et al. (Elkind et al., 2017) for ranked ballots1.
They require that, if a winning candidate c is moved forward in some vote, then
c must still belong to some winning committee.
Elkind et al. (Elkind et al., 2017) justified this axiom with the following idea:
“If c belongs to a winning committee W then, generally speaking,
we cannot expect W to remain winning when c is moved forward in
some vote, as this shift may hurt other members of W .”
1Elkind et al. (Elkind et al., 2017) also proposed another axiom called non-crossing mono-
tonicity that will not be considered in this paper.
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In this paper we propose to extend the notion of candidate monotonicity for
approval-based multi-winner voting rules in several directions. First of all, we
study what happens when a subset G of the candidates that was already in the
set of winners W is added to the ballot of some voter. Following the idea of
Elkind et al. (Elkind et al., 2017) that we have quoted before, we believe that we
cannot expect W to remain winning, but we can expect that all the candidates
in G (strong version) or, at least, some of the candidates in G (weak version)
remain winning.
Secondly, we consider monotonicity when a new voter enters the election
and approves of a subset of the candidates that was already in the set of win-
ners. Again, we define a strong and a weak version of this axiom. A similar
idea of monotonicity when new voters enter the election has been proposed by
Woodall (Woodall, 1994) for ranked ballots.
Definition 3. We say that a rule R satisfies strong support monotonicity with
population increase (respectively, weak support monotonicity with population
increase) if for each election E = (N,C,A, k), and for each non-empty subset G
of C, such that |G| ≤ k, the following conditions hold: (i) if G ⊆ W for some
W ∈ R(E), then G ⊆ W ′ for some W ′ ∈ R(E∆G) (respectively, G ∩W
′ 6= ∅ for
some W ′ ∈ R(E∆G)); and (ii) if G ⊆W for all W ∈ R(E), then G ⊆W ′ for all
W ′ ∈ R(E∆G) (respectively, G ∩W ′ 6= ∅ for all W ′ ∈ R(E∆G)).
We say that a rule R satisfies strong support monotonicity without pop-
ulation increase (respectively, weak support monotonicity without population
increase) if for each election E = (N,C,A, k), for each non-empty subset G of
C, such that |G| ≤ k, and for each voter i such that Ai ∩ G = ∅, the following
conditions hold: (i) if G ⊆ W for some W ∈ R(E), then G ⊆ W ′ for some
W ′ ∈ R(Ei+G) (respectively, G ∩W
′ 6= ∅ for some W ′ ∈ R(Ei+G)); and (ii) if
G ⊆ W for all W ∈ R(E), then G ⊆ W ′ for all W ′ ∈ R(Ei+G) (respectively,
G ∩W ′ 6= ∅ for all W ′ ∈ R(Ei+G)).
We believe that it is important to know what happens when the support of
several of the candidates in the set of winners is incremented simultaneously.
Moreover, our results show that for each of the rules that we consider that
satisfies any of the support monotonicity axioms (with or without population
increase) for |G| = 1, such rule also satisfies the corresponding weak support
monotonicity axiom (for all values of |G|), which is slightly stronger, and there-
fore provides more information about the behaviour of the rule. Because of
this, we do not study candidate monotonicity in this paper. We note, however,
that we have been able to build (weird) rules that satisfy support monotonicity
with or without population increase for |G| = 1 but fail the corresponding weak
axiom (examples can be found in appendix A).
We now discuss briefly the relevance of these axioms for the three types of
scenarios considered in the Introduction. First of all we note that it is a general
property of elections to desire to select winners that receive a high support, and
therefore we believe that our weak axioms are generally desirable.
In the case of excellence, we believe that the strong axioms are highly prefer-
able to the weak ones. Since we are looking for the best candidates, adding
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support to a subset of the candidates that were already considered to be among
the best should make all of them stay in the set of winners.
In contrast, in the case of diversity we believe that satisfying the strong
axioms is not important for the rule used in the election. We recall that the
goal of the election is that every voter has one of her preferred candidates in the
set of winners. If the support of a subset G of the winners was increased and at
least one of them remained in the set of winners, then the voters that approve
of the candidates in G would be satisfied. Removing some of the candidates in
G from the set of winners may allow to add other candidates approved by other
voters that did not have previously any of their approved candidates in the set
of winners. Therefore, for an election of the diversity type, we believe that it
would be enough if the rule satisfies the weak axioms.
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017) distinguish two
types of proportional representation. In the first type of proportional represen-
tation the aim is that each voter is represented by a candidate that she approves
of and that each candidate represents the same number of voters. The typical
example of this type of scenario are parliamentary elections. As in the case
of diversity, in this type of scenario we believe that it is enough to satisfy the
weak axioms. Regarding the second type of proportional representation consid-
ered by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017), the goal is
that, for each ℓ-cohesive group of voters (see Definition 1), as most voters of the
group as possible approve of at least ℓ of the candidates in the set of winners.
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017) present as an exam-
ple of this type of elections the selection of researchers invited to give a seminar
in an academic department. We believe that the situation in this case is less
clear. It seems that the weak axioms are not enough for this situation because
a voter may not be satisfied with having only one of her preferred candidates in
the set of winners. However, the strong axioms are maybe too strong if a voter
that belongs to an ℓ-cohesive group of voters decides to approve of a subset of
the set of winners G of size greater than ℓ.
From now on, we will refer to support monotonicity with population in-
crease as SMWPI and to support monotonicity without population increase as
SMWOPI. Table 1 summarizes the results we have obtained in this paper. With
respect to the support monotonicity axioms (columns entitled “SMWPI” and
“SMWOPI”) we use the keys “Str.” when the rule satisfies the strong version
of the axiom, “Wk.” when the rule satisfies the weak version of the axiom and
“No” when the rule does not satisfy any of them. The column entitled “C. M.”
contains the results related to committee monotonicity, which is discussed in
Section 4.
For completeness, we also include previous results related to the computa-
tional complexity of the rules and the representation axioms that they sat-
isfy, including pointers to the appropriate references. The column entitled
“JR/PJR/EJR” shows for each rule the strongest of these axioms satisfied by
the rule. The next column says which rules satisfy the perfect representation
axiom (PR), that will be discussed in Section 5.
An important type of rules in approval-based multi-winner elections are
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Rule Complexity JR/PJR/EJR PR SMWPI SMWOPI C. M.
AV P a No d NoEx. 10 Str.Thm. 1 Str.Thm. 3 Yes
SAV P a No d NoEx. 10 Str.Thm. 1 Str.Thm. 3 Yes
MAV NP-hardk Nod NoEx. 11 Str.Thm. 4 Wk.Thm. 4 NoEx. 8
CC NP-comp.b JR d Yesg, Ex. 13 Str.Thm. 1 Wk.Thm. 2 NoEx. 9
Monroe NP-comp.b JR d,e Yes h NoEx. 4 Wk.Thm. 5 NoEx. 9
PAV NP-comp.a EJR d No h Str.Thm. 1 Wk.Thm. 2 No j
SeqPAV Pa Nod,h NoEx. 12 Wk.Thm. 6 Wk.Thm. 6 Yes
max-Phragme´n NP-comp.c PJR c,f Yes c Wk.i, Thm. 7 Wk.i, Thm. 7 No i
seq-Phragme´n P c PJR c No c Wk.i Wk.i Yes
a Results taken from (Aziz et al., 2015) and (Skowron et al., 2016).
b Results taken from (Procaccia et al., 2008).
c Results taken from (Brill et al., 2017).
d Results taken from (Aziz et al., 2017).
e Monroe satisfies PJR if k divides n (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017).
f max-Phragme´n satisfies PJR when combined with certain tie-breaking rule (Brill et al., 2017).
g CC satisfies PR if ties are broken always in favour of the candidates subsets that provide PR.
h Results taken from (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017).
i Results taken from (Janson, 2016), (Mora and Oliver, 2015), and (Phragme´n, 1896).
j Results taken from (Thiele, 1895).
k Results taken from (LeGrand et al., 2006).
Table 1: Properties of approval-based multi-winner voting rules
approval-based multi-winner counting rules, which, as discussed by Lackner and
Skowron (Lackner and Skowron, 2018b, 2018a), can be seen as analogous to the
class of committee scoring rules introduced by Elkind et al. (Elkind et al., 2017)
for ranked-based multi-winner elections.
Definition 4. A counting function f : {1, . . . , k}× {1, . . . , |C|} → R is a func-
tion that satisfies that f(x, y) ≥ f(x′, y) whenever x > x′. Intuitively, a counting
function f defines the score f(x, y) that a certain counting rule rf assigns to a
voter i that approves of x candidates in the set of winners W and y candidates
in total. Given a counting function f , and an election E = (A, k), the total
score of a candidates subset W for counting function f is
sf(W, E) =
∑
i∈N
f(|Ai ∩W |, |Ai|),
and the counting rule rf associated to counting function f is defined as
follows:
rf (E) = argmax
W⊆C:|W |=k
sf (W, E).
As discussed by Lackner and Skowron (Lackner and Skowron, 2018b, 2018a)
several of the voting rules that we have presented in the previous section are
counting rules. In particular, we have fAV(x, y) = x for AV, fSAV(x, y) =
x
y
for
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SAV, fCC(x, y) = 1 if x > 0 and fCC(0, y) = 0 for CC, and fPAV(x, y) =
∑x
j=1
1
j
if x > 0 and fPAV(0, y) = 0 for PAV.
For counting rules we have the following results with respect to support
monotonicity.
Theorem 1. Every counting rule satisfies strong SMWPI.
Proof. Consider an election E = (A, k), a counting function f and its associated
rule rf , a set of winners W outputted by rf for election E and a non-empty
subset G of W . We are going to prove that W also belongs to rf (E∆G). The
theorem follows from that immediately.
Consider any other candidates subset W ′ of size k. We simply have to
observe that the total score ofW for election E∆G under rule rf is
∑
i∈N f(|Ai∩
W |, |Ai|)+f(|G∩W |, |G|), that
∑
i∈N f(|Ai∩W |, |Ai|) ≥
∑
i∈N f(|Ai∩W
′|, |Ai|)
(because W is a set of winners for rule rf and election E), and that f(|G ∩
W |, |G|) = f(|G|, |G|) ≥ f(|G∩W ′|, |G|) (by the definition of counting function).
We can also prove weak SMWOPI by introducing a slight restriction to the
counting functions that is satisfied by all the counting rules that we consider in
this paper.
Theorem 2. Consider a counting function f . If f satisfies that f(x, y) ≥
f(x, y′) whenever y ≤ y′, and that for each positive integer z it holds that
f(x+ z, y + z) ≥ f(x, y), then its associated rule rf satisfies weak SMWOPI.
Proof. Consider an election E = (A, k), a counting function f and its associated
rule rf , a set of winners W outputted by rf for election E , a non-empty subset
G of W , and a voter i such that she does not approve of the candidates in G.
We observe first that because Ai and G are disjoint, for each candidates
subsetW ′ it holds that f(|(Ai∪G)∩W ′|, |Ai∪G|) = f(|Ai∩W ′|+|G∩W ′|, |Ai|+
|G|) and that sf (W ′, Ei+G)− sf (W ′, E) = f(|Ai ∩W ′|+ |G ∩W ′|, |Ai|+ |G|)−
f(|Ai ∩W ′|, |Ai|).
Suppose that f satisfies that f(x, y) ≥ f(x, y′) whenever y ≤ y′, and that
for each positive integer z it holds that f(x + z, y + z) ≥ f(x, y), and consider
any candidates subset W ′ of size k such that W ′ ∩G = ∅. Then,
sf (W, Ei+G)− sf (W ′, Ei+G) =
(sf (W, E) + f(|Ai ∩W |+ |G ∩W |, |Ai|+ |G|)
−f(|Ai ∩W |, |Ai|))
−(sf(W ′, E) + f(|Ai ∩W ′|+ |G ∩W ′|, |Ai|+ |G|)
−f(|Ai ∩W ′|, |Ai|))
= sf (W, E)− sf (W
′, E)
+f(|(Ai ∩W |+ |G|, |Ai|+ |G|)− f(|(Ai ∩W |, |Ai|)
−(f(|Ai ∩W ′|, |Ai|+ |G|)− f(|Ai ∩W ′|, |Ai|)) ≥ 0.
This proves part (i) of the definition of weak SMWOPI. The proof of part
(ii) of the definition of weak SMWOPI follows from the fact that if G ⊆W for
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all W ∈ rf (E), then sf(W, E) − sf (W ′, E) > 0, and therefore, the inequality in
the equation above is strict.
However, of the counting rules that we consider in this paper only AV and
SAV satisfy strong SMWOPI.
Theorem 3. AV and SAV satisfy strong SMWOPI.
Proof. The counting functions of AV and SAV hold that f(x, y) = xf(1, y). This
makes it possible to assign each candidate c a score sf (c, E) =
∑
i:c∈Ai
f(1, |Ai|)
irrespective of which other candidates are in the set of winners W so that
sf (W, E) =
∑
c∈W sf (c, E). Therefore, the winners in AV and SAV are the
k candidates with the highest candidate score. It is now enough to observe
that each candidate that belongs to G increases her score in election Ei+G in
f(1, |Ai| + |G|) with respect to her score in election E , and that the scores of
the candidates that are not in G do not increase.
The following examples prove that PAV and CC fail strong SMWOPI.
Example 1. Let k = 4 and C = {c1, . . . , c7}. 131 voters cast the following bal-
lots: for i, j = 1 to 3, 3 voters approve of {ci, cj+4}, 100 voters approve of {c4}, 1
voter approves of {c1, c2}, 1 voter approves of {c1, c2, c3}, and 2 voters approve
of {c5, c6}. For this election PAV outputs one set of winners: {c1, c2, c3, c4},
with a PAV score of 391/3. However, if the voter that approves of {c1, c2} de-
cides to approve of {c1, c2, c3, c4}, then PAV outputs only {c4, c5, c6, c7}, with
a PAV score of 131. Intuitively, this example works as follows. First, the 100
voters that approve of {c4} force that c4 has to be in the set of winners. Second,
the first 27 votes force that either {c1, c2, c3} or {c5, c6, c7} are in the set of
winners. The last 4 votes break the tie between {c1, c2, c3, c4} and {c4, c5, c6, c7}
in the two cases considered.
Example 2. Let k = 3 and C = {a, b, c, d, e}. 13 voters cast the following
ballots: 2 voters approve of {a, d}, 2 voters approve of {a, e}, 2 voters approve
of {c, d}, 2 voters approve of {c, e}, 2 voters approve of {b}, 2 voters approve
of {a}, and 1 voter approves of {d}. For this election CC outputs one set of
winners: {a, b, c} (one voter misrepresented). Now, we consider two consecutive
increases of support of {b, c}, where, in each increase one of the voters that
approve of {a} decides to approve of {a, b, c}. Then, after the first increase of
support of {b, c}, CC outputs {a, b, c} and {b, d, e} (one voter misrepresented),
and after the second increase of support of {b, c} CC outputs only {b, d, e} (0
voters misrepresented). Observe that this example proves that CC fails strong
SMWOPI even when it is combined with any tie breaking rule, because if the
tie breaking rule selects {a, b, c} after the first increase of support, then strong
SMWOPI is violated in the second increase of support, and if the tie breaking
rule selects {b, d, e} after the first increase of support, then strong SMWOPI is
violated in the first increase of support.
Let us now turn to analyze the remaining voting rules.
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Theorem 4. MAV satisfies strong SMWPI and weak SMWOPI.
Proof. Consider first an election E = (A, k), a set of winners W outputted by
MAV for election E , and a non-empty subset G of W . Since G ⊆ W , we have
d(W,G) = |W \ G| + |G \W | = k − |G|. For each candidate set W ′ of size
k such that a candidate c exists that belongs to G but not to W ′, we have
d(W ′, G) = |W ′ \ G| + |G \W ′| ≥ (k − |G| + 1) + 1 = k − |G| + 2. Therefore,
max{maxi∈N d(W,Ai), d(W,G)} has to be less than or equal to
max{maxi∈N d(W ′, Ai), d(W ′, G)}. This proves that MAV satisfies strong pop-
ulation monotonicity with population increase.
Consider now an election E = (A, k), a set of winners W outputted by MAV
for election E , a non-empty subset G ofW , and a voter i that does not aprove of
any of the candidates in G. We observe first that (Ai∪G)\W = Ai\W , and that
|W \(Ai∪G)| = |W \Ai|−|G|, and therefore, d(W,Ai∪G) = d(W,Ai)−|G|. For
each candidates setW ′ of size k such that W ′∩G = ∅, we have d(W ′, Ai∪G) =
|W ′\(Ai∪G)|+ |(Ai∪G)\W ′| = |W ′\Ai|+ |Ai\W ′|+ |G| = d(W ′, Ai)+ |G|. It
follows immediately that for each candidates setW ′ of size k such thatW ′∩G =
∅, the maximum Hamming distance between W ′ and the voters in election Ei+G
does not decrease with respect to the maximum Hamming distance between W ′
and the voters in election E , and therefore, that W or another set of candidates
that includes some of the candidates in G must be output by MAV for election
Ei+G.
However, the following example shows that MAV fails strong SMWOPI.
Example 3. Let k = 5 and C = {c1, . . . , c7}. 9 voters cast the following ballots:
1 voter approves of {c1}, 1 voter approves of {c2}, 1 voter approves of {c3}, 1
voter approves of {c5}, for i, j = 0 to 1, 1 voter approves of {c1, c4+i, c6+j}, and
1 voter approves of {c1, c6}. For this election the only set of winners output by
MAV is {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}. The Hamming distance between {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5} and
the ballot profile of each voter is always less than or equal to 5 (in particular, the
Hamming distance between {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5} and {c1, c6} is 5). We show now
that for any other candidate subset of size 5 there is a ballot profile with distance
6 to such candidate subset. First, for each j = 1, 2, 3, and for each candidate
subset W of size 5 such that cj does not belong to W , the Hamming distance
between W and {cj} is 6. There exist 6 candidates subsets of size 5 that contain
c1, c2, and c3 (one of them is {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}). For i, j = 0 to 1, the Ham-
ming distance between {c1, c2, c3, c4+i, c6+j} and {c1, c5−i, c7−j} is 6. The only
remaining candidates subset is {c1, c2, c3, c6, c7}, that has a Hamming distance
with {c5} of 6. Observe that the Hamming distance between {c1, c2, c3, c6, c7}
and all the other ballot profiles is always less than or equal to 4. Now, if the voter
that approves of {c5} decides to approve of {c1, c2, c3, c4, c5}, then the Hamming
distance between the ballot profile of such voter and {c1, c2, c3, c6, c7} falls to 4,
and therefore, in that case MAV would output only {c1, c2, c3, c6, c7}.
Theorem 5. The Monroe rule satisfies weak SMWOPI.
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Proof. Consider an election E = (A, k), a set of winnersW outputted by Monroe
for election E , a non-empty subset G of W , and a voter i that does not approve
of any of the candidates in G. Let πW be a mapping that minimizes the mis-
representation of W for election E . Clearly the misrepresentation of W with
mapping πW for election Ei+G is the same as for election E if the candidate
πW (i) assigned by πW to voter i does not belong to G and is equal to the mis-
representation ofW with mapping πW for election E minus one if πW (i) belongs
to G. Furthermore, for each candidates set V such that V ∩ G = ∅, and for
each mapping πV of the voters in N to the candidates in V it holds that the
candidate πV (i) assigned by πV to voter i belongs to Ai ∪G if and only if such
candidate belongs to Ai and, therefore, the misrepresentation values of V with
mapping πV are the same for election Ei+G and for election E .
Examples 4 and 5 prove that Monroe fails weak SMWPI and strong SM-
WOPI, respectively. As in the case of CC, these examples prove that Monroe
fails weak SMWPI and strong SMWOPI even if combined with any tie breaking
rule.
Example 4. Let k = 4 and C = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h}. 33 voters cast the fol-
lowing ballots: 5 voters approve of {a, e}, 4 voters approve of {a, g}, 5 voters
approve of {b, e}, 4 voters approve of {b, h}, 5 voters approve of {c, f}, 4 voters
approve of {c, g}, 3 voters approve of {d, f}, and 3 voters approve of {d, h}.
For this election Monroe outputs only {e, f, g, h} (misrepresentation 1 due to
one of the voters that approve of e being represented by h). We now consider
two consecutive voters that enter the election, such that each of the new voters
approves of {e}. Then, after the first new voter enters the election, Monroe out-
puts {a, b, c, d} and {e, f, g, h} (misrepresentation 2) and, after the second new
voter enters the election, Monroe outputs only {a, b, c, d} (misrepresentation 2:
the new voters would be represented by candidate d).
Example 5. Let k = 3 and C = {a, b, c, d, e}. 18 voters cast the following
ballots: 2 voters approve of {a}, 2 voters approve of {a, d}, 2 voters approve
of {a, e}, 4 voters approve of {b}, 1 voter approves of {b, e}, 4 voters approve
of {c, d}, and 3 voters approve of {c, e}. For this election Monroe outputs only
{a, b, c} (misrepresentation 1 due to one of the voters that approve of c being
represented by candidate b). Now, we consider two consecutive increases of
support of {b, c}, where, in each increase one of the voters that approve of {a}
decides to approve of {a, b, c}. Then, after the first increase of support of {b, c},
Monroe outputs {a, b, c} and {b, d, e} (misrepresentation 1), and after the second
increase of support of {b, c} Monroe outputs only {b, d, e} (misrepresentation 0).
The results for SeqPAV and seq-Phragme´n are studied together, although
for seq-Phragme´n we need first an intermediate lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider an election E = (A, k), a set of winners W outputted by
seq-Phragme´n for election E, a non-empty subset G of W , and a voter i that does
not approve of any of the candidates in G. Let h be the first iteration in which a
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candidate that belongs to G is added to the set of winners by seq-Phragme´n, and
let ch be such candidate. Then, it holds that s
(h)
ch ≥
1+x
(h−1)
i +
∑
r:ch∈Ar
x(h−1)r
1+|{r:ch∈Ar}|
.
Proof. Brill et al. (Brill et al., 2017) prove that for each election (A, k), and for
each 1 ≤ j ≤ k, it holds that s(1) ≤ . . . ≤ s(k), where s(j) is the load s
(j)
cj of the
candidate cj elected at iteration j. Therefore, s
(j)
cj ≥ x
(j−1)
r for each iteration
j and each voter r. Thus, in the case of election E and iteration h we have
s
(h)
ch =
1+
∑
r:ch∈Ar
x(h−1)r
|{r:ch∈Ar}|
≥
1+x
(h−1)
i +
∑
r:ch∈Ar
x(h−1)r
1+|{r:ch∈Ar}|
.
The following theorem has already been proved by Phragme´n (Phragme´n,
1896) and Janson (Janson, 2016) for seq-Phragme´n in the case in which |G| = 1.
Our proof follows the same ideas.
Theorem 6. SeqPAV and seq-Phragme´n satisfy weak SMWPI and weak SM-
WOPI.
Proof. Consider an election E = (A, k), a set of winnersW outputted by SeqPAV
(respectively, by seq-Phragme´n) for election E , a non-empty subset G ofW , and
a voter i that does not aprove of any of the candidates in G. Let h be the first
iteration in which a candidate that belongs to G is added to the set of winners
by SeqPAV (respectively, by seq-Phragme´n) and let ch be such candidate. We
observe first that while no candidate that belongs to G is added to the set of
winners, the SeqPAV score (for SeqPAV) and the load (for seq-Phragme´n) of
each candidate is the same for elections E , E∆G, and Ei+G. For each of E∆G and
Ei+G there are therefore two possibilities: either a candidate that belongs to G
is added to the set of winners by SeqPAV (respectively, by seq-Phragme´n) in the
first h−1 iterations (in that case, the theorem holds) or the first h−1 candidates
added to the set of winners by SeqPAV (respectively, by seq-Phragme´n) for
elections E∆G and Ei+G are the same (and selected in the same order) as the
first h− 1 candidates added to the set of winners by SeqPAV (respectively, by
seq-Phragme´n) for election E . We now simply observe that for E∆G and Ei+G if
the first h−1 candidates added to the set of winners by SeqPAV (respectively, by
seq-Phragme´n) are the same and in the same order as those added for election
E , then at iteration h the SeqPAV score of candidate ch increases with respect to
her SeqPAV score for election E and the load of candidate ch (for seq-Phragme´n)
decreases with respect her load for election E (in the case of election Ei+G this
follows from lemma 1), while the SeqPAV score and the load of all the candidates
that do not belong to G does not change. This proves that the candidate elected
at iteration h both by SeqPAV and seq-Phragme´n in elections E∆G and Ei+G
must belong to G.
The following example proves that SeqPAV and seq-Phragme´n fail both
strong SMWPI and strong SMWOPI.
Example 6. Let k = 4 and C = {a, b, c, d, e}. 19 voters cast the following bal-
lots: 7 voters approve of {a, b, d}, 4 voters approve of {a, b, e}, 3 voters approve
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of {a, c, d}, and 5 voters approve of {a, c, e}. For this election both SeqPAV and
seq-Phtagme´n output only {a, b, c, d} (the candidates are added to the set of win-
ners in this order). Now, if an additional voter enters the election and approves
of only {c, d}, then both SeqPAV and seq-Phtagme´n output only {a, d, e, b} (the
candidates are added to the set of winners in this order). This proves that both
SeqPAV and seq-Phragme´n fail strong population monotonicity with population
increase. To prove that SeqPAV and seq-Phragme´n fail strong population mono-
tonicity without population increase we simply add an additional candidate f
to the original election and a voter that approves of {f}. This does not make
any difference and the set of winners both with SeqPAV and seq-Phragme´n will
be again {a, b, c, d}. Now, if this new voter decides to approve of {c, d, f}, then
both SeqPAV and seq-Phragme´n output only {a, d, e, b}.
Mora and Oliver (Mora and Oliver, 2015) have previously observed that
seq-Phragme´n fails the strong support monotonicity axioms. This fact has also
been discussed by Janson (Janson, 2016) (they use different examples from the
one presented here). The previous example is included for competeness and as
a counterexample for SeqPAV.
We study now support monotonicity for max-Phragme´n. Phragme´n (Phragme´n,
1896) proved that max-Phragme´n satisfies support monotonicity when |G| = 1.
That proof could be easily extended to prove that max-Phragme´n satisfies weak
SMWPI and weak SMWOPI.
Theorem 7. max-Phragme´n satisfies weak SMWPI and weak SMWOPI.
Proof. We first prove weak SMWOPI. Consider an election E = (A, k), a set
of winners W output by max-Phragme´n for election E , a non-empty subset G
of W , and a voter i that does not approve of any of the candidates in G. Let
xopt = (xopti′,c)i′∈N,c∈W be a load distribution that minimizes the maximum voter
load for election E and candidates subset W , and let mE be the maximum voter
load for load distribution xopt, that is, mE = maxi′∈N x
opt
i′ .
Observe that xopt is a valid, possibly non-optimal, load distribution for elec-
tion Ei+G and candidates subset W . In particular, for each candidate c that
belongs to G, since voter i does not approve of c in election E , it holds that
xopti,c = 0.
Consider now any candidates subset W ′ of size k such that W ′ ∩ G = ∅.
Observe that for the candidates subset W ′ the set of valid load distributions
for election Ei+G are the same as the set of valid load distributions for election
E . In particular, for voter i, the candidates for which xi,c can be greater than
0 are Ai ∩W ′ both in election E and in election Ei+G. It follows immediately
that the minimum maximum voter load for candidates subset W ′ is the same
in elections E and Ei+G.
Since the minimum maximum voter load for the candidates subset W does
not increase in election E∆G with respect to election E and, for each candidates
subset W ′ such that W ′ ∩ G = ∅ the minimum maximum voter load for the
candidates subset W ′ is the same in elections Ei+G and E , it follows that W
or some candidates subset that contains some of the candidates in G must be
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output by max-Phragme´n for election Ei+G. Further, if for all the set of winners
W output by max-Phragme´n for election E it holds that G ⊆W , then for each
candidates subset W ′ such that W ′ ∩G = ∅ the minimum maximum voter load
for the candidates subsetW ′ is strictly greater thanmE , and therefore, it cannot
be a set of winners for election Ei+G.
The proof for weak SMWPI follows from the facts that max-Phragme´n sat-
isfies weak SMWOPI, and that for any election E the sets of winners output by
max-Phragme´n do not change if we add a voter to the election that does not
approve of any candidate.
However, the following example proves that max-Phragme´n fails both strong
SMWPI and strong SMWOPI.
Example 7. Let k = 6 and C = {a, b, c1, . . . , c5}. 18 voters cast the following
ballots: 13 voters approve of {c1, . . . , c5}, 2 voters approve of {a, b}, 2 voters ap-
prove of {a}, and 1 voter approves of {b}. For this election max-Phragme´n out-
puts only one set of winners: {a, c1, . . . , c5}. The minimum maximum load for
this election is achieved as follows: for each voter i that approves of {c1, . . . , c5}
and each candidate c in {c1, . . . , c5} we have xi,c =
1
13 , and for each voter i
′
that approves of a we have xi′,a =
1
4 . Then, the load of the voters that approve
of {c1, . . . , c5} is
5
13 and the load of the voters that approve of a is
1
4 . The max-
imal voter load for this example is therefore 513 . Now, if a new voter enters the
election and approves of precisely {a, c1, . . . , c5}, then the sets of winners out-
putted by max-Phragme´n consist of {a, b} plus 4 candidates from {c1, . . . , c5}.
In this case the minimum maximum voter load is achieved by assigning again
xi,c =
1
13 for each voter i that approves of {c1, . . . , c5} and each candidate c in
{c1, . . . , c5}, assigning xi,a =
1
3 to the new voter and the voters that approve of
{a}, and assigning xi,b =
1
3 to all the voters that approve of candidate b. This
leads to a maximum voter load of 13 . Observe that in this case the minimum
maximum voter load for the set {a, c1, . . . , c5} would be obtained by xi,c =
1
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for each voter i that approves of {c1, . . . , c5}, and also for the new voter, which
leads to a maximum voter load of 514 , greater than
1
3 . This example proves that
max-Phragme´n fails strong support monotonicity with population increase.
To prove that max-Phragme´n fails strong support monotonicity without pop-
ulation increase we simply add an additional candidate d to the original election
and a voter that approves of {d}. This does not make any difference and the set
of winners will be again {a, c1, . . . , c5}. Now, if this new voter decides to ap-
prove of {a, c1, . . . , c5, d}, then the sets of winners outputted by max-Phragme´n
consist of {a, b} plus 4 candidates from {c1, . . . , c5}.
4 Committee monotonicity
We turn now to discuss briefly committee monotonicity. The following defi-
nition, due to Elkind et al. (Elkind et al., 2017), was given in the context of
multi-winner voting rules that make use of ranked ballots, but it can also be
directly used for approval-based multi-winner voting rules.
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Definition 5. We say that a voting rule R satisfies committee monotonicity
if for every election E = (N,C,A, k), with k ∈ {1, . . . , |C| − 1}, the following
conditions hold:
1. for each W in R(E = (N,C,A, k)) there exists a W ′ in R(N,C,A, k + 1)
such that W ⊆W ′, and
2. for each W in R(N,C,A, k + 1) there exists a W ′ in R(E = (N,C,A, k))
such that W ′ ⊆W .
It is generally believed that committee monotonicity is a desirable axiom
for scenarios of type excellence (Faliszewski et al., 2017; Elkind et al., 2017;
Barbera´ and Coelho, 2008).
It is easy to see that committee monotonicity is satisfied by the rules that
consist of an iterative algorithm such that at each iteration the candidate that
is added to the set of winners does not depend on the target committee size.
This holds for AV, SAV, seqPAV, and seq-Phragme´n.
For the remaining rules it is easy to find counterexamples where they fail
committee monotonicity. We start with MAV.
Example 8. Let C = {a, b, c}. 4 voters cast the following ballots: 1 voter
approves of {b}, 1 voter approves of {c}, 1 voter approves of {a, b}, and 1 voter
approves of {a, c}. For this set of candidates and this ballot profile, for k = 1
MAV outputs only {a} (with a maximum Hamming distance of 2). For k = 2,
MAV outputs only {b, c} (also with a maximum Hamming distance of 2).
Thiele (Thiele, 1895) and Mora and Oliver (Mora and Oliver, 2015) have al-
ready proved that PAV and max-Phragme´n, respectively, fail committee mono-
tonicity. We give here an example that shows that both CC and Monroe fail
committee monotonicity.
Example 9. Let C = {a, b, c}. 10 voters cast the following ballots: 3 voters
approve of {a, b}, 3 voters approve of {a, c}, 2 voters approve of {b} and 2 voters
approve of {c}. For this set of candidates and this ballot profile, for k = 1 both
CC and Monroe output only {a}. For k = 2, both CC and Monroe output only
{b, c}.
5 Compatibility of axioms
In many applications it would be interesting to use voting rules that satisfy
both support monotonicity and representation axioms. While all the voting
rules that we have analyzed that satisfy PJR (or EJR) also satisfy the weak
support monotonicity axioms, the situation changes when we require the strong
axioms. In particular, none of the rules analyzed that satisfy PJR also satisfy
strong SMWOPI, and only PAV (which has the additional difficulty of being
NP-hard to compute) satisfies strong SMWPI. Whether it is possible to develop
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a voting rule that satisfies strong SMWOPI and PJR at the same time is left
open.
In contrast, we can formally prove that perfect representation (PR) is incom-
patible both with strong SMWPI and with committee monotonicity. We review
first the definition of PR due to Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez
et al., 2017).
Definition 6. Perfect representation (PR) Consider a ballot profile A over
a candidate set C, and a target committee size k, k ≤ |C|, such that k divides
n. We say that a set of candidates W , |W | = k, provides perfect representation
(PR) for (A, k) if it is possible to partition the set of voters in k pairwise disjoint
subsets N1, . . . , Nk of size
n
k
each, such that each candidate w in W can be
assigned to one (and only one) different subset Ni so that for all pairs (w,Ni) all
the voters in Ni approve of their assigned candidate w. We say that an approval-
based voting rule satisfies perfect representation (PR) if for every election (A, k)
it does not output any winning set of candidates W that does not provide PR
for (A, k) if at least one set of candidates W ′ that provides PR for (A, k) exists.
Theorem 8. No rule can satisfy PR and strong SMWPI at the same time.
Proof. Consider the following election. Let k = 3 and C = {c1, . . . , c5}. 12
voters cast the following ballots: 2 voters approve of {c1, c4}, 2 voters approve
of {c1, c5}, 3 voters approve of {c2, c4}, one voter approves of {c2, c5}, 2 voters
approve of {c3, c5}, and 2 voters approve of {c3}. For this election any voting
rule that satisfies PR has to output {c1, c2, c3}. Now, suppose that 3 new
voters enter the election, and that all these new voters approve of {c1, c3}.
For this extended election a voting rule that satisfies PR has to output only
{c3, c4, c5}.
There is an apparent contradiction between this theorem and Table 1 because
Table 1 says that CC satisfies both PR and strong SMWPI. The reason for this
apparent contradiction is that, as explained in Footnote g, CC satisfies PR
only if ties are broken in favour of the sets of candidates that provide PR.
The example of Theorem 8 illustrates this. For the initial election CC outputs
{c1, c2, c3} and {c3, c4, c5}. However, if ties are broken in favour of the sets of
candidates that provide PR, then CC (with this tie-breaking rule) will output
only {c1, c2, c3}. Now, after adding 3 new voters that approve of {c1, c3}, strong
SMWPI requires that both c1 and c3 are in the set of winners while PR requires
that the set of winners is {c3, c4, c5}.
Whether strong SMWOPI and PR are compatible axioms is unclear. We
observe that if a certain candidates subset W provides PR for a certain election
E = (A, k), then for each non-empty candidates subset G of W , and for each
voter i such that Ai ∩ G = ∅, it holds that W also provides PR for Ei+G. It
is enough to observe that the same assignment between candidates and voters
that works for E will also work for Ei+G. In particular if voter i approved of her
assigned candidate w in election E , this means that w ∈ Ai, and therefore voter
i approves of w also in election Ei+G.
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Theorem 9. No rule can satisfy PR and committee monotonicity at the same
time.
Proof. Consider the following election. Let C = {c1, . . . , c5}. 6 voters cast the
following ballots. For i = 1 to 3, and for j = 1 to 2, one voter approves of
{ci, c3+j}. If the target committee size is 2, a voting rule that satisfies PR has
to output only {c4, c5}, but if the target committee size is 3, a voting rule that
satisfies PR has to output only {c1, c2, c3}.
SMWPI SMWOPI Com. Mon.
JR Str. Wk.(Str.?) Yes
PJR Str. Wk.(Str.?) Yes
EJR Str. Wk.(Str.?) ?
PR Wk. Wk.(Str.?) No
Table 2: Summary of results on compatibility between representation and mono-
tonicity axioms
Table 2 summarises the results that we have found in this paper with re-
spect to the compatibility between representation and monotonicity axioms. Of
course, the rules that we have found before that satisfy a certain monotonicity
axiom and a certain representation axiom at the same time prove that such
axioms are compatible. In the table, “Str.” means that the strong version of
the support monotonicity axiom is compatible with the corresponding represen-
tation axiom, “Wk.” means that the weak version of the support monotonicity
axiom is compatible with the corresponding representation axiom but that the
strong version of the support monotonicity axiom and the corresponding rep-
resentation axiom are incompatible, and “Wk.(Str.?)” means that the weak
version of the support monotonicity axiom is compatible with the correspond-
ing representation axiom but that we do not know whether the the strong version
of the support monotonicity axiom and the corresponding representation axiom
are compatible.
6 Related Work
There exists some previous work that consider support monotonicity in the
context of approval-based multi-winner elections. Aziz and Lee (Aziz and Lee,
2017) propose several notions of monotonicity for weak preferences (ties be-
tween candidates are allowed), and then they consider the restriction of such
notions to approval ballots. The strongest monotonicity axiom that they pro-
pose when restricted to approval ballots corresponds essentially to the candidate
monotonicity axiom that we have presented before (they also call this axiom
candidate monotonicity).
Lackner and Skowron (Lackner and Skowron, 2018a) consider a different
(and much more stronger) notion of support monotonicity, defined for a subclass
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of the approval-based multi-winner voting rules called ABC ranking rules. They
use this axiom to characterize a subset of the ABC ranking rules that they call
Dissatisfaction Counting Rules (AV belongs to this class of rules). In particular,
a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to satisfy such axiom is that if a voter
i that is already in the election adds a candidate w that was already in the set of
winners W , then W must still be a set of winners (possibly tied with other sets
of winners). It follows that this axiom is strictly stronger than strong SMWOPI.
According to Janson (Janson, 2016), Phragme´n also studied support mono-
tonicity in the approval-based rules that he proposed. In particular, Phragme´n
proved that max-Phragme´n and seq-Phragme´n satisfy support monotonicity
when only one candidate increases her support, either because a voter already
in the election adds such candidate to her ballot (candidate monotonicity) or
because a new voter enters the election and approves of only such candidate.
Mora and Oliver (Mora and Oliver, 2015) and Janson (Janson, 2016) have
recently extended the study of the monotonicity properties of seq-Phragme´n. In
particular, they give examples that prove that seq-Phragme´n fails both strong
SMWPI and strong SMWOPI. We stress the following differences between the
works of Mora and Oliver (Mora and Oliver, 2015) and Janson (Janson, 2016)
and ours: 1) they do not consider weak SMWPI and weak SMWOPI; and 2)
they do not formalize the strong axioms (they only give examples that show
that seq-Phragme´n fails them).
There is also some relation between our work and the work of Peters (Peters,
2018). Peters (Peters, 2018) defines an axiom that they call strategyproofness
that is similar to SMWOPI. For a rule f that satisfies this axiom it cannot
happen that W ′ ∩ (Ai ∪ G) ( W ∩ (Ai ∪ G), were W is the output of rule f
for election E = (A, k) and W ′ is the output of rule f for election Ei+G (they
assume that the rules are resolute). As we have already said, this axiom is
similar to SMWOPI although neither strong SMWOPI implies strategyproofness
nor strategyproofness implies weak SMWOPI. Peters (Peters, 2018) prove that
strategyproofness is not compatible with a representation axiom that is even
weaker than JR using SAT solvers.
7 Conclusions and future work
In this paper we have complemented previous work on the axiomatic study of
multi-winner voting rules with the study of monotonicity axioms for rules that
use approval ballots. Our results show that support monotonicity in approval-
based multi-winner voting rules is trickier than it may seem at first glance.
While the weak support monotonicity axioms are satisfied in almost all the cases
analyzed in this study (only Monroe fails one of these) the situation changes
completely when we look to the strong axioms. Of the 7 rules analyzed only 4
satisfy strong SMWPI and only 2 satisfy strong SMWOPI.
We have also presented some results related to the compatibility between
representation and monotonicity axioms. First, we have proved that PR is in-
compatible both with strong SMWPI and with committee monotonicity. Our
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results also show that EJR and PJR are compatible with strong SMWPI and
weak SMWOPI (in particular, PAV satisfies all these axioms). Our incompati-
bility results are mostly of theoretical interest because PR rules are NP-hard to
compute (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017) and therefore of little practical use.
However, we believe that these results are interesting because they illustrate the
existence of a certain conflict between representation and monotonicity axioms.
With respect to the compatibility between EJR and PJR with monotonicity
axioms, several interesting open questions remain open. First of all, the only
rule that we have found that satisfies EJR (or PJR) and strong SMWPI is PAV,
which is known to be NP-hard to compute. Therefore, it would be very inter-
esting to find a rule that satisfies EJR (or PJR) and strong SMWPI but can
be computed in polynomial time. Very recently, Aziz, Elkind, Huang, Lackner,
Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez, and Skowron (Aziz et al., 2018) have identified a set of vot-
ing rules that satisfy EJR and can be computed in polynomial time. The study
of these rules could be interesting in this regard.
In the second place, it is also open whether EJR and PJR are compatible
with strong SMWOPI. Other open issues would be to find a rule that satisfies
both EJR and committee monotonicity and to find a rule that satisfies strong
SMWOPI and PR. The similarity between the strategyproofness axiom pro-
posed by Peters (Peters, 2018) and SMWOPI makes us think that the use of
SAT solvers could be a possible approach to address these research questions.
We have also studied the relevance of our axioms to several types of scenarios.
We have found that our support monotonicity axioms fit well with all the cases
studied except in the case of the second type of proportional representation
discussed by Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al. (Sa´nchez-Ferna´ndez et al., 2017), where
the goal is to satisfy large cohesive groups according to their size. Therefore, it
would be interesting to define an additional support monotonicity axiom that
fits well in this scenario and is compatible with EJR (which is oriented to this
type of proportional representation). The development of an adapted version of
the notion of noncrossing monotonicity proposed by Elkind et al. (Elkind et al.,
2017) for ranked ballots could also be a line of continuation of this work.
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A Examples of rules that satisfy SMWPI or SM-
WOPI when |G| = 1 but fail the correspond-
ing weak axiom
In this section we present two rules that satisfy SMWPI or SMWOPI when
|G| = 1 but fail the corresponding weak axiom. They are probably useless in
practice but show that such situation is possible.
A.1 A rule that satisfies SMWPI when |G| = 1 but fails
weak SMWPI
The following rule trivially fails weak SMWPI but satisfies SMWPI when |G| =
1:
r¬weakSMWPI = argmax
W⊆C:|W |=k
∑
c∈W
|{i : Ai = {c}}| −
∑
c∈W
|{i : c ∈ Ai, |Ai| ≥ 2}|
A.2 A rule that satisfies SMWOPI when |G| = 1 but fails
weak SMWOPI
A rule that satisfies SMWOPI when |G| = 1 but fails weak SMWOPI can be
obtained by tweaking AV.
Given a candidates set C, a permutation σC : C → C over such candi-
dates set, and a subset A of C, we say that σC(A) = {c ∈ C : ∃c′ ∈ A, c =
σC(c
′)}. Given an election E = (N,C,A = (A1, . . . , An), k), a permutation
σN : N → N over N , and a permutation σC : C → C over C, we say that
σN (E) = (N,C,A
′ = (AσN (1), . . . , AσN (n)), k), and that σC(E) = (N,C,A
′′ =
(σC(A1), . . . , σC(An)), k).
The rule AV¬weakSMWOPI outputs exactly the same sets of winners as AV
except in the particular case that in the election there are 4 voters, 4 candidates,
and k = 2. In such particular case, the election can be represented as E = (N =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, C = {c1, c2, c3, c4},A = (A1, A2, A3, A4), k = 2).
Then,
E1 = (N,C, ({c1, c2}, {c3, c4}, {c1, c3, c4}, {c2, c3, c4}), k)
AV¬weakSMWOPI(E1) = {{c1, c2}, {c3, c4}}
E2 = (N,C, ({c1, c2}, {c1, c2, c3, c4}, {c1, c3, c4}, {c2, c3, c4}), k)
AV¬weakSMWOPI(E2) = {{c3, c4}}
Observe that this automatically implies that AV¬weakSMWOPI fails weak SM-
WOPI, because if the voter that approves of {c3, c4} in the E1 decides to approve
of {c1, c2, c3, c4} neither c1 nor c2 can be in the set of winners.
We impose that for any permutation σN : N → N over the voters, and
any permutation σC : C → C over the candidates, W is a set of winners
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for σC(σN (E1)) under rule AV
¬weakSMWOPI if and only if σC(W ) is a set of
winners for election E1. Also, W is a set of winners for σC(σN (E2)) under rule
AV¬weakSMWOPI if and only if σC(W ) is a set of winners for election E2.
In all the remaining cases, the rule AV¬weakSMWOPI outputs the same sets of
winners as AV. It can be shown that AV¬weakSMWOPI satisfies SMWOPI when
|G| = 1.
B Results related to perfect representation
We provide here the proofs and counterexamples related to PR for the rules
studied in this paper and that have not been studied elsewhere. First we give
examples that shows that AV, SAV, MAV, and seqPAV fail PR and then we
prove that CC satisfies PR if combined with the appropriate tie-breaking rule.
Example 10. Let k = 3 and C = {a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3}. 3 voters cast the follow-
ing ballots: 2 voters approve of {a1, a2, a3} and 1 voter approves of {b1, b2, b3}.
In this example both AV and SAV output {a1, a2, a3}. However, all the candi-
dates subsets that provide PR for this example have to include one candidate
from {b1, b2, b3}.
MAV also fails PR as the following example shows.
Example 11. Let k = 3 and C = {a1, a2, b1, b2, b3}. 3 voters cast the following
ballots: 2 voters approve of {a1, a2} and 1 voter approves of {b1, b2, b3}. In
this example the sets of winners outputted by MAV contain 1 candidate from
{a1, a2} and 2 candidates from {b1, b2, b3}. However, all the candidates subsets
that provide PR for this example have to include {a1, a2} and one candidate
from {b1, b2, b3}.
Finally, here is an example for SeqPAV.
Example 12. Let k = 2 and C = {a, b, c}. 6 voters voters cast the following
ballots: 2 voters approve of {a, b}, 2 voters approve of {a, c}, 1 voter approves
of {b} and 1 voter approves of {c}. The only candidates subset that provides
PR for this example is {b, c}. However, SeqPAV adds candidate a (the most
approved of one) to the set of winners in the first iteration.
Consider now the case of CC. It is evident that for each election E = (A, k)
in which candidates subsets that provide PR exist, for each candidates subset
W that provides PR for election E it holds that all the voters that participate in
the election approve of some of the candidates inW . It follows immediately that
W would have misrepresentation 0 according to the rules in CC, and therefore
that W is outputted by CC for election E . It may happen, however, that CC
outputs sets of winners that do not provide PR even if sets of winners that
provide PR exist.
Example 13. We consider again the election in example 10. One of the sets of
winners that CC outputs for this election is {a1, b1, b2}. However, all the can-
didates subsets that provide PR for this example have to include two candidates
from {a1, a2, a3}.
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In summary, CC satisfies PR only if ties are broken always in favour of the
candidates subsets that provide PR.
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